18 ideas
18170 | The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |