13 ideas
| 6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |