64 ideas
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
| 4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
| 4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
| 4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
| 4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
| 4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
| 4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
| 4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
| 4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
| 4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
| 4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
| 4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |