Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic' and 'fragments/reports'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant]
Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant]
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant]
All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]