Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Carnap and Logical Truth', 'Behaviorism' and 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB]