Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'A Subject with No Object' and 'Db (ideas)'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
4465 Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
4686 Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
7415 Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
7414 What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
6696 The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
9921 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4687 Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9924 Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
9933 The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
9928 Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
9926 A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6516 Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9932 The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
9923 We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
9925 Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9934 Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9918 Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
9929 Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9927 Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
9930 Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
24054 Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
3875 If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3876 If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7734 Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
7735 Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9919 The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
3877 Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
9922 If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
6126 Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
3873 An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
3874 How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]