10 ideas
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 21240 | The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell] |