23 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
24016 | Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre] |
24013 | An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre] |
24017 | Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre] |
24014 | Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre] |
24015 | Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
20491 | States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |