53 ideas
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
15640 | Courage is not a virtue, but the form of every virtue at its testing point [Lewis,CS] |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |