Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', 'On the Philosophy of Logic' and 'Thought and Responsibility'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20166 A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]