Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Modality', 'A Theory of Justice' and 'Explanation in Mathematics'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
13166 Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23110 Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
15676 Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
4123 A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3279 Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
3280 Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls]
20552 The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
18636 Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
18631 All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
20538 Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
9277 Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
20527 Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
21018 The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum]
21041 Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
23583 If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]