18 ideas
22438 | Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
22436 | Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine] |
22431 | Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
22435 | The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine] |
22433 | It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine] |
3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
22437 | Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine] |
22434 | Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine] |
22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
22430 | If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine] |
13713 | Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider] |