31 ideas
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |