11 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |