Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Modality', 'Fifteen Sermons' and 'Monadology'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]