13 ideas
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
| 21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
| 21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
| 21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |