Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis', 'People and Their Bodies' and 'Absolute Necessities'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
11092 A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
11093 We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
11101 General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
11096 Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16209 How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
11095 We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
11104 Concepts are language [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
11102 Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]