35 ideas
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
12157 | Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton] |
20346 | The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim] |
18547 | Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton] |
24172 | It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant] |
20408 | With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant] |
20409 | When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant] |
20411 | Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant] |
24170 | Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant] |
22711 | The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch] |
4025 | Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C] |
20412 | Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant] |
22046 | The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21458 | The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner] |
5643 | Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton] |
20410 | The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |