34 ideas
8208 | In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine] |
8207 | The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine] |
10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
8205 | Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine] |
18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
8206 | Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |