Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Individuation of Attributes', 'Semantic Necessity' and 'Truth and Meaning'

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15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7332 There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
14620 Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18441 No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
18440 Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14530 The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14622 Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]