15 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |