33 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
10397 | Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
10396 | If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P] |
10395 | Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P] |
15384 | Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
8481 | The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
15385 | Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard] |
15383 | Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
10398 | Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P] |
18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |