16 ideas
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
6581 | Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Hume, by Fogelin] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |