29 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |