27 ideas
19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |