12 ideas
| 7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 18198 | Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine] |
| 23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |