39 ideas
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
| 14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
| 14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
| 14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
| 14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |