Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology', 'There is No A Priori (and reply)' and 'Introspection'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]