Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Frege philosophy of mathematics' and 'Papers of 1913'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett]
Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett]
It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett]
'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett]
An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait]
We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett]