24 ideas
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
1631 | You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine] |
1632 | Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |