31 ideas
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
4688 | We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |