56 ideas
| 9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
| 9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
| 9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
| 9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
| 9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
| 9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
| 10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
| 10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
| 9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
| 10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
| 9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
| 9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
| 10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
| 9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
| 9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
| 23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
| 23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
| 23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
| 9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
| 9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
| 11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
| 9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
| 23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
| 23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
| 9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
| 23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
| 23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
| 23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
| 23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
| 23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
| 23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
| 23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
| 23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
| 23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
| 23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
| 23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
| 23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
| 23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
| 23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
| 23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
| 23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
| 23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
| 23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
| 23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
| 23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
| 23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
| 23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
| 23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
| 23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
| 23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |