14 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 8463 | Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine] |
| 8461 | The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine] |
| 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
| 8462 | A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine] |
| 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |