Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositional Objects', 'Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification' and 'Thinking About Mechanisms'

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18 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
18969 How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
19000 Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18967 A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
18968 The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
18970 The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine]