Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology', 'Introducing Persons' and 'The Theory of Objects'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]