68 ideas
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
20657 | There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
20656 | Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
20655 | Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
20650 | The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
20649 | The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
20661 | Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson] |
20647 | Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson] |
20654 | Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson] |
20651 | The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson] |
20652 | In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson] |
20658 | Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson] |