109 ideas
| 15447 | We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato] |
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 243 | It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato] |
| 241 | We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato] |
| 21264 | Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato] |
| 251 | Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato] |
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 21259 | To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 21260 | Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 276 | My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 249 | People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato] |
| 265 | An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato] |
| 269 | Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato] |
| 240 | It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato] |
| 264 | The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato] |
| 253 | Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato] |
| 263 | The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato] |
| 4332 | Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato] |
| 248 | A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato] |
| 235 | Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato] |
| 277 | The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato] |
| 254 | Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato] |
| 266 | Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato] |
| 256 | Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato] |
| 242 | The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato] |
| 245 | Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato] |
| 239 | Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato] |
| 262 | Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato] |
| 1402 | Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato] |
| 236 | Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato] |
| 259 | Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato] |
| 257 | Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato] |
| 238 | Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato] |
| 260 | Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato] |
| 4331 | Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato] |
| 250 | The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato] |
| 275 | Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
| 273 | Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato] |
| 8004 | In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre] |
| 21257 | Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato] |
| 21258 | The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato] |
| 21261 | Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato] |
| 274 | Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato] |
| 21263 | If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato] |
| 278 | If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato] |
| 21265 | The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato] |
| 21262 | There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato] |