Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'The Laws' and 'New Essays on Human Understanding'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


170 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz]
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz]
I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato]
A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato]
Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato]
The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato]
The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato]
Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato]
Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato]
Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato]
The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz]
A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato]
The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato]
Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato]
If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz]