34 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |