15 ideas
19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |