Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Ars Magna' and 'Identity and Essence'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Lull's combinatorial art would articulate all the basic concepts, then show how they combine [Lull, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Nine principles of God: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory [Lull, by Arthur,R]