29 ideas
24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |