Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' and 'Meaning and Reference'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
2557 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
2556 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4726 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
2549 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9169 A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
5819 Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
2548 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
6599 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2566 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
2553 The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
2550 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
9168 I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
5820 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2560 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
9170 We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2559 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
5817 Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
2558 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
5818 If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]