Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'The Origin of Forms and Qualities' and 'A Subject with No Object'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15957 Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
9921 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9924 Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
9933 The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
9928 Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
9926 A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9932 The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
9923 We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
9925 Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9934 Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9918 Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
9929 Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9927 Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
9930 Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15965 Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16735 In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16034 Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
15953 To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15962 Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
15964 Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
15960 Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9919 The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
15952 The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
15972 The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
9922 If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]