Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Carnap and Logical Truth', 'Truthmaking for Presentists' and 'Truth and Probability'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
9004 If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
9001 Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13766 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9005 Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
19143 Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]