31 ideas
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
22121 | The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22122 | Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22127 | Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22126 | Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
22129 | Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22130 | Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22128 | Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22123 | The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22124 | We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |