Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Modality', 'Vagueness and Contradiction' and ''Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
9136 The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22366 There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber]
22367 The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
9131 Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
9139 If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
9140 Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
9119 No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
9135 We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
9125 Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
9137 Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9116 Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9132 An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9128 It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
9130 Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
9118 The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
9124 We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
9126 Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
9121 Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
9134 The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9133 Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
9129 I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
9122 God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]