19 ideas
| 22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
| 22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
| 22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
| 22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
| 22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
| 22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
| 22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
| 22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
| 22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |