15 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
| 14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
| 14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
| 14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
| 14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |