Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Individuation of Attributes', 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]